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The Continued Resonance and Challenge of the “Ius 
Commune” in Modern European Contract Law   
 
 





The need for a more consistent and coherent European contract law is 
a current priority of the EC institutions. Despite decades of pointillistic legal 
harmonization, cross border transactions within the Internal market of the 
European Union continue to take place in the shadow of divergent procedural 
and substantive law rules, differing legal cultures and significant linguistic 
diversities. Whilst national contract law systems function more or less 
efficiently internally, it is their partial non-compatibility with other Member 
States’ private laws that provokes isolated distortions on the market. As a 
consequence, the European Commission has presented its ‘Common Frame of 
Reference’ research strategy aimed at fostering common contract law 
principles, model rules and uniform legal terminology, which, it is believed, 
will better facilitate commercial actors. The European Parliament has moved a 
step further by lending institutional credibility to the case for a European civil 
code. However, this clamour for codification of private laws – an idea 
premised on two formalisms, legal and economic - has in many respects 
overlooked the mechanics of modern commercial contracting in particular, the 
importance of contract drafting and the complex negotiations that lead to 
deals both domestically and cross border. This paper therefore provides an 
alternative assessment of the development of a European ius commune, or 
‘common law’ of contract, and considers the urgency of improved means of 
legal information exchange in order to better facilitate the ongoing 
harmonization effort.   
 
Introduction 
                                                 
* Ph.D candidate, European University Institute, Florence. Associate Researcher, 
Institute of European Studies, Madrid. Member of the Honourable Society of Gray’s 
Inn and the Bar European Group, London.  Member of the Society of European 
Contract Law, Erlangen and the European Private Law Forum, Florence. I am most 
grateful to the IALL conference delegates for their helpful suggestions on an earlier 
version of this paper. In particular, sincere thanks are owed to Professor Jacques 
Ziller and Dr. Eleanor Cashin-Ritaine for their insightful comments and analysis of 
this contribution.   




“… no other area better than the law could epitomise the past and 
present history, the glories and decays, the hopes and the fears, and above all, 
the present titanic challenge of Europe …  Twenty-one countries - to count, 
quite artificially, only those in the 'West' from Iceland to Cyprus - each with a 
distinct legal system, represent an irrational, suicidal division within a 
modern world which demands larger and larger open areas of personal, 
cultural, commercial, labour and other exchanges.  Harmonisation, co-
ordination, interdependence are absolute needs of our time; and history is 
there to provide clear evidence that division is not an eluctable fate, that 
indeed division is a relatively recent phenomenon in a Continent which, for 
centuries in past epochs, was characterised by a law common to all its 
people.”1 
 
A quarter of a century has passed since the preceding words of the 
late Professor Mauro Cappelletti were delivered in an opening address to 
participants at a colloquium entitled New Perspectives for a Common Law of 
Europe2 at the European University Institute in Florence, and they serve as a 
helpful introduction to the contemporary debate regarding the future direction 
of European contract law.3 Despite these noble sentiments, however, contract 
law systems in the EU are not converging. Cross border transactions continue 
to take place in the shadow of divergent substantive and procedural law rules, 
differing legal cultures and significant linguistic diversities.   
 
Whilst Member States’ national contract law systems function more 
or less efficiently internally, it is their partial non-compatibility with other 
Member States’ private laws that provokes isolated distortions on the market 
                                                 
1 Cappelleti, M. (ed.), New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe, Reports 
from the symposium inaugurating The European University Institute, Badia 
Fiesolana, Florence, 1976 (1978). 
2 Id. 
3 Whilst this terminology is used by the primary European institutions and is now 
‘de moda’ in academic literature, it is important to remind ourselves that at present 
‘EC contract law’ remains a ‘work in progress’. Cynics will argue that time-honored 
bureaucratic wisdom provides that the less inclined you are to act in a particular field, 
the more you have to talk about it; and that this alone explains the flurry of activity in 
Brussels. Such a view is evidently shortsighted and minimises the degree of 
legitimate interest within the Community institutions. Moreover, as Grundmann 
stresses, the emerging body of Community private law rules increasingly impacts 
upon the formation, the content and the termination of contracts and thus can no 
longer be ignored by practitioners. See Grundmann, S., The Structure of European 
Contract Law, 4 European Review of Private Law 505, 2001.  
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and reduces the attractiveness of cross-border commerce both for business 
and consumers. As a consequence, the European Commission has presented 
its ‘Common Frame of Reference’ research strategy aimed at fostering 
common contract law principles, model rules and/or uniform legal 
terminology, which, it is believed, will further facilitate commercial actors.4 
The European Parliament has moved a step further by lending institutional 
credibility to the case for a European Civil code.5  
 
                                                 
4 It is anticipated that the Common Frame, or CFR, ought to comprise general 
principles complete with commentary, model rules and definitions of abstract legal 
terminology. The decision to draft the CFR has gained the full endorsement of the 
Council and Parliament and represents the first prong of a tripartite strategy. In July 
2001, the Commission of the European Communities (the “Commission”) initiated a 
comprehensive debate with stakeholders in industry, the business and academic 
community, legal practice and consumer organizations on the potential negative 
impact of divergences in contract law on the proper functioning of the internal 
market. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on European Contract Law, COM (2001) 398 final, 11.07.2001. 
(Hereinafter cited as the 2001 Communication). Stakeholder feedback prompted a 
subsequent ‘Action Plan’ in February 2003 (hereinafter cited as the 2003 Action Plan) 
and a Follow-Up Communication in 2004 (hereinafter cited as the 2004 Follow Up 
Communication). See respectively, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament, ‘A More Coherent European Contract Law, An 
Action Plan’, COM (2003) 68 Final, 12.02.2003 and Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on ‘European contract law 
and the revision of the acquis: the way forward’, COM (2004) 651 final, 11.10.2004. 
These three primary  Commission discussion documents on general European 
contract law ought further to be read in light of the Green Paper on European Union 
Consumer Protection, COM (2001) 531 final, 02.10.2001. The relevant 
documentation, and additional background material, is currently accessible via the 
‘European Contract Law’ website of the Directorate General for Health and 
Consumer Protection at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/ind
ex_en.htm. 
5 For a critical examination of those primary market forces, both economic and 
legal, which promote harmonisation and legal uniformity see, inter alia, Mistelis, L., 
‘Is Harmonisation a Necessary Evil?  The Future of Harmonisation and New Sources 
of International Trade Law’ in Fletcher, I. & Mistelis, L., Foundations and 
Perspectives of International Trade Law, Sweet & Maxwell Publishing, London, 
2001. Rossett suggests that these forces are too powerful to resist and as such will 
ultimately “force the success of European regional unification”, see Rossett, A., ‘The 
Unification of American Commercial Law: Restatements and Codification’ in il 
Diritto Privato Europeo: Problemi e Prospettive, a curria di Luigi Moccia, Atti degli 
Convegno Internazionale, Macerata, June 8-10, Guifffrè Editore, Milano, 1989.    
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The idea of codification, as an undertaking of ‘legal rationalization 
and democratization’6 remains topical despite fundamental differences in 
systematic structure, procedure and legal culture prevailing between the 
common and civil law communities, allied to “the deep-seated fears of 
common lawyers about codification.”7 Doubt has further been expressed as to 
whether the harmonization of rules serves to promote convergence in 
                                                 
6 Chamboredon, A., ‘The Debate on a European Civil Code:  For an Open 
Texture’, in van Hoecke, M. & Ost, F., The Harmonisation of European Private Law, 
Hart Publishing, 2000, pp.63-99, at p.82. 
7 See Clarke, M., Doubts from the Dark Side - The Case Against Codes, Journal 
of Business Law, pp.605-615, November, 2001; see also Malaurie, P., Le Code Civil 
Européen des Obligation - Une Question Toujours Ouverte, La Semaine Juridique 
Édition Générale, No.6, pp. 281-285, 6 février, 2002. The constitutional significance 
of private law discourse is seldom appreciated by public law communities. In turn, 
European private law scholars rarely forage deep into areas of public law. The 
absence of such an interdisciplinary dialogue is doubtless one of the primary reasons 
why private law specialists, in discussing the regulatory framework required for 
contractual relations to flourish in the new Europe, have tended to promote 
codification as a definitive solution. However, the process of consolidating the 
modern Dutch Civil Code of 1992 began in 1947.  The time-scale required in order to 
agree upon and to fashion an equivalent comprehensive supra-national code, covering 
civil and commercial law matters (and leaving aside corporate, consumer and labor 
law which a number of academics suggest should be codified) suggests that the Code 
would greet the world still-born, unable to adequately meet the challenges of 
technological and commercial innovation. For possible means of negativing such 
drawbacks, see Doris, M.J., Beyond a Still-born European Civil Code, Position paper 
presented at conference on ‘European Contracting’, Centre for the Study of the Lex 
Mercatoria, Tromsø, May 2003. Moreover, the current position of hegemony enjoyed 
by the common law of contract as the law of commerce has allowed law firms from 
the United Kingdom and United States to gain “a distinct advantage in cross border 
legal transactions”, an advantage that will not be relinquished gently. See Becker, 
W.M., Lawyers get down to business, The McKinsey Law Review (2001) at p.46. 
Resistance would undoubtedly increase in the event of heightened Community 
regulation of commercial contracts. It has been noted that the UK’s commercial and 
maritime legal services attract business to the value of £800 million in invisible 
earnings. Submissions from the Commercial Bar in London and the Law Societies of 
England and Wales to the European Commission (see Commission website, op cit, 
n.2) contend that the ‘privileged position’ of English contract law in international 
commerce may be threatened by the development of a uniform European contract 
law. Sound judicial decision-making, enforceable judgments and the location of 
London, in particular, are just some factors cited in support of English commercial 
contract laws and dispute resolution procedures, see Patchett-Joyce, M., Why London 
is and will continue to be a Centre for the Resolution of International Commercial 
Law Disputes, article accessible via the website of Monkton Chambers, London.  
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practice.8 It is therefore apparent that any developments toward a greater 
harmonization of substantive EU-wide rules will require similar advances 
towards a common European legal method.  
 
An analysis of the ‘ius commune’ naturally evokes contract law’s 
rich historical tapestry and the various classical, materialized and procedural 
visions that continue to shape modern doctrinal debate. It further calls to mind 
the quest for a satisfactory supporting ethic for modern practice. Fleeting 
references to the age of classical contract law, to codification and to modern 
Europe being divided between Thibauts and Savignys9 currently rhyme with a 
general concurrence among contemporary common lawyers that the early 
formation of the English law of contract owed much to the “creative 
plagiarism” of earlier civil law jurists.10 This knowledge may add little to the 
current harmonization debate but retains a certain modern charm since it may 
be argued that Restatements are likewise the product of similar acts of 
“creative plagiarism”, seeking to extract, rationalize and synthesize the 
“common core” of European and transnational contract law from existing 
national legal systems. For Samuel, the harmonization debate should therefore 
be “[t]he catalyst for rethinking legal theory, since the theories that are 
presently underpinning legal analysis are, arguably, incapable of handling the 
epistemological complexities presented by unification.”11  This view is 
reinforced by Benson who observes that: 
 
at the close of the twentieth century, the situation of contract law 
presents the following contrast. On the one hand, in both the common 
                                                 
8 Scott, R.E., The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law - A Comparative 
Analysis of Common Law & Code Methodologies, in pp.151-171 in Kraus, J.S. & 
Walt, S.D., The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law, The 
Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law Series, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
9 Lando considers the ‘codifiers’ to be modern-day Thibauts, after Professor 
Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut who, in 1814, advocated the enactment of a civil code 
in Germany and the ‘cultivators’ as Savignys, after Friedrich Carl von Savigny, who 
in the same year published a manifesto opposing such a project, see Lando, O., Why 
does Europe need a Civil Code?, Position Paper presented at Leuven Society of 
European Contract Law conference, 2001. 
10 Adams, J. & Brownsword, R., Understanding Contract Law, 2nd Edition, 1996, 
at p.32. See also Doris, M.J., Did we lose the baby with the bath water? The 
Scholastic Contribution to the Common Law of Contracts, 11(2) Texas Wesleyan 
Law Journal 556 (2005). Grossi, P., ‘Historical Models and Present Plans in the 
Formation of a Future European Law’ in Gambaro, A. & Rabello, A.M. (eds) 
Towards a New European Ius Commune, Jerusalem, 1999. 
11 Samuel, G., English Private Law in the Context of the Codes, in The 
Harmonisation of European Private Law, ibid, at pp.47-58.  
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law and civil law the definitions of and mutual connections between 
the various principles of contract law are for the most part well-settled 
and no longer subject to controversy.  Indeed, despite differences in 
formulation, the main elements of the law of contract are strikingly 
similar in both legal systems, and these systems, whether directly or 
by derivation, prevail throughout most of the contemporary world. 
The authoritative public articulation of the law of contract has 
achieved a certain apparent completeness and acceptability. The same 
cannot be said, however, of efforts to understand the law at a 
reflective level. In common law jurisdictions at least, there is at 
present no generally accepted theory or even family of theories of 
contract. To the contrary, there exist only a multiplicity of competing 
theoretical approaches, each of which, by its very terms, purports to 
provide a comprehensive yet distinctive understanding of contract but 
which, precisely for this reason, is incompatible with the others. 
Moreover, we seem to lack a suitable criterion by which to adjudicate 
among them, let alone to combine them in an ordered and integrated 
whole. The point has come when we appear to doubt the value and 
indeed the very possibility of a coherent and morally plausible 
general theory of contract, one that could gain wide acceptance. Yet, 
in the absence of such a theory, how can we vouchsafe the internal 
consistency and reasonableness which the law claims for its doctrines 
and principles? Unless we are able to make explicit the conception of 
contract that underlies these doctrines and principles, we do not fully 
understand them and whatever understanding we may have of them 
must of necessity be partial and deficient. At a time when the public 
authoritative articulation of the main elements of contract is relatively 
settled and complete, this failure is particularly unsatisfactory.12 
  
It has further been suggested that the current perceived frailty of 
modern European contract doctrine, in both civil and common law 
jurisdictions, derives from the fact that the philosophical foundations of 
contract were lost as the theological and philosophical certainties of early and 
middle age legal theory met the free-thinking rationalism of the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This analysis provides that the 
iconoclasm of the Enlightenment thinkers allied to the exigencies of the early 
development of laissez faire liberalism in effect produced something of a 
“legal mutation” and bequeathed a more practical but theoretically 
                                                 
12 Benson, P., ‘The Unity of Contract Law’ in Benson, P (ed), The Theory of 
Contract Law ~ New Essays, Cambridge Studies in the Philosophy of Law, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, at p.118. 
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impoverished doctrine to the European contract lawyers who succeeded them. 
Whilst we may not wish to clone these earlier more philosophically rooted 
species, we may presume, prima facie, that, in seeking to rationalize the 
modern phenomenon of contract, the existing theoretical disorder owes much 
to the severing of the umbilical cord of its philosophical life-support.13 This 
alternative historical analysis further reveals important lessons with regard to 
the partial success and failure of legal transplants and the emergence of 
dominant legal positions/theories in legal mainstream thought due to their 
wide distribution and accessibility.14  Evidence of a partial legal fusion of the 
common and civil law worlds and the emergence of a novel system also lends 
much greater support to Vivienne Grosswald Curran’s convincing argument 
that the new emerging body of EC contract laws will display fragments of 
both systems.15  
   
THE CONTINUED RESONANCE AND CHALLENGE OF THE ‘IUS COMMUNE’ 
 
The European Commission has consistently reinforced its view that 
“freedom of contract” or party autonomy remains the guiding principle for its 
ongoing harmonization strategy. The Commission’s 2003 Action Plan and 
2004 Follow Up Communication adopted a narrowly restricted approach to 
contract law based on the need to address “concrete and practical problems” 
impeding the proper functioning of the internal market. The removal of 
                                                 
13 See Gordley, J., The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994., at p.73.  Gordley makes the startling claim 
that modern theories of contract law cannot function logically without much of the 
Aristotelian and Thomistic concepts that were purged from the law during the 
Enlightenment era.  For this reason, “[t]wo hundred years later, when we theorise 
about contract law, we still find ourselves at the same crossroads” in Gordley, J., 
‘Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition’ in Benson, P. (ed), The Theory of 
Contract Law - New Essays, Cambridge University Press, 2001. See also, Ibettson, 
D.J., A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1999. Zimmermann, R., Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law:  
The Civilian Tradition Today, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. 
14 Watson, A., Legal Transplants, p.12, Harvard University Press, 1987.  For a 
contrary opinion, see Legrand’s view of a divergent legal ‘mentalité’ or ‘moralité’, 
which act to prevent the harmonisation of common and civil law legal systems. 
Legrand contends that a synchronization between common and civil law systems is 
impossible due to their being founded on distinct ‘volksgeist’ or ‘moralité’, see 
Legrand, P., The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 111 Maastricht J. of Eur. & 
Comp. Law, 1997. 
15 Grosswald Curran, V., Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law:  Legal 
Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, Columbia Journal of 
European Law, Volume 7, Number 63, Winter, 2001.  
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technical and legal impediments to cross border trade and the improvement of 
existing and future legislation therefore form the frontispiece of the 
Commission strategy and, as a consequence, debate on wider fairness and 
distributive justice concerns in private law,16 and the political and symbolic 
significance of unified civil legislation17 are largely circumscribed.18  
In line with this restricted vision, current difficulties in European 
contracting will arguably be considered and confronted as mere 
‘interoperability’ problems. Code making and the isolation of common rules 
                                                 
16 It barely merits repeating that soft law instruments, code-making and the 
building up of the lex mercatoria has become synonymous with business inspired and 
business-driven private law. Indeed, it is commonly overlooked that in initial 
discussions in the 1970’s it was towards a European commercial code that Professor 
Ole Lando and members of the DG Internal Market were aiming and this idea 
continues to find expression in the writings of leading ‘codifiers’. Illustrative of this 
trend is Bonell, M.J., Do we need a global commercial code? [2000] 5 Uniform L. 
Rev. 469. For many of this persuasion, as Zumbansen neatly puts it: “political 
problems of exclusion and freedom have allegedly been resolved by the universal 
spread of private autonomy” per Zumbansen, P., Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial 
Arbitration and Transnational Law [2002] 8(3) ELJ 400. The building up of a 
transnational private law society or “privatrechtsgesellschaft” has thus far come at the 
expense of consumer interests and behind softened globalised private laws, Mattei 
perceives a narrow conservative political agenda subservient to business self-interest. 
Somewhat perversely his solution to combat ‘corporate rapacity’ through a surrender 
of the law is a “hard” European civil code that imposes binding legal rules. For 
equally strong academic criticism of the technocratic agenda promoted via the CFR, 
see Social Justice in European Contract Law – A Manifesto, 10(6) European Law 
Journal 2004, and Cohen, E.S., Allocating Power and Wealth in the Global Economy: 
The Role of Private Law and Legal Agents [2002] CSGR Working Paper, 101/02.  
17 The decision to ratify a European Civil Code has strong political dimensions - 
see  Hesselink, M., The Politics of European Contract Law, 10(6) European Law 
Journal 2004, Wilhelmsson, T., The Legal, the Cultural and the Political - 
Conclusions from Different Perspectives on Harmonisation of European Contract 
Law, European Business Law Review, 2002, at pp.541 et seq. Schmid suggests that in 
order to quell opposition to the idea of codification, the Commission has adopted the 
euphemistic term ‘Optional Instrument’, see Schmid, C. & Doris, M., EU Tenancy 
Law and Procedure, EC Official Publication, 2004; at. p.9. 
18 Action Plan, Identified Problem Areas, point 3.14. Importantly, as Basedow 
observes, ‘contract law, in the eyes of the Community, does not exist as a body of law 
per se, but as an instrument to attain specific goals of the EC Treaty’ in Basedow, J. 
The Case for a European Contract Act, position paper presented at the Centre for a 
Common Law of Europe, K.U. Leuven and Society of European Contract Law 
(Secola) Conference, Communication from the Commission on European Contract 
Law - Harmonisation, Code, Optional Code, Leuven, November 30 & December 1, 
2001.  
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and principles has a natural appeal to legislatures and bureaucratic institutions 
which typically display a diminished interest in traditionally academic 
peculiarities. Much to the chagrin of many in the Trento ‘common core’ 
group, for example, the Commission has largely overlooked their insistence 
upon the need for ‘legal cartography’ research aimed at pinpointing points of 
divergence and convergence without any underlining political agenda. Yet, as 
Nottage noted in 2001, the most rational strategy must involve parallel 
research on both common rules and ‘underlying context.’19 What is missing in 
the current climate of rule-fixation is a supplementary institutional analysis of 
harmonization strategies and a closer attention to the social, economic and 
political context of private law rules.20  
 
Unearthing the Common Core of ‘European Contract Law’ and a 
Salutary Lesson for the Present 
 
Traditional common and civil law opinion provides that the doctrines 
underpinning orthodox or classical contract theory, were creations of the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and it has been widely suggested and 
repeated that the concept of freedom of contract was “the inevitable 
counterpart of a free enterprise system”.21  Common law opinion, in 
particular, has almost universally accepted that the emergence of the doctrine 
of freedom of contract in English law owed much to the dominance of 
classical liberalism and laissez faire economics in the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.     
 
The leading proponent of this analysis is Atiyah,22 who argues that, 
“the fact is that freedom of contract was at the very heart of classical 
economics, and there is ground for thinking that the common lawyers may 
have taken over the concept from the economists in the early part of the 
                                                 
19 See Nottage, L., Convergence, Divergence and the Middle Way in Unifying or 
Harmonising Private Law (2001) EUI wps, Law 2001/01 and Blanc-Jouvan, X., 
Reflections on the “Common Core of European Private Law" Project (2001) 1(1) 
Global J.F.     
20 Niglia has been particularly active in this regard, particularly in his assessment 
of the implementation of the Unfair Terms directive into Member States law. See 
Niglia, L., The Transformation of European Contract Law, Kluwer/Aspen (2002). 
21 Pound, R., Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale Law Journal, 1909. 
22 Atiyah, P.S., The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, Clarendon Oxford 
Press, Oxford, 1979., pp.294 et seq.  Atiyah's analysis of the historical development 
of the doctrine of freedom of contract and the ‘will theory’ is predicated upon this 
observation which forms the basis of his work.  Undoubtedly, the author has had a 
seminal influence on the majority of modern commentators. 
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nineteenth century.” Indeed, in the majority of European jurisdictions, a 
similar analysis prevails. It would appear that contract theorists have 
universally accepted that the pillars of classical contract theory were, “the 
masterpiece of the philosophy of law that dominated the nineteenth century: 
that of legal individualism.”23  Or as Williston suggests, “freedom of contract 
and the will theories arose because [a] gospel of freedom was preached by 
both metaphysical and political philosophers in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century.... It was a corollary of the philosophy of freedom and 
individualism that the law ought to extend the sphere and enforce the 
obligation of contract.” 24 The law did so by requiring a meeting of the minds 
– or ‘accord de volontés’ - for the formation of a contract and by allowing the 
parties to contract on whatever terms they might choose.  
 
This view of contract as an emblematic institution encompassing the 
various economic and liberal philosophies of the nineteenth century evidently 
appeals to many legal historians.25 Nevertheless a novel historiography of the 
genealogy of European contract law, as articulated in part by Wieacker, 
Watkin and Ibbetsson, and most notably by Gordley, provides that reverence 
for Romano-Canon contract doctrine and in particular the principle pacta sunt 
servanda endured throughout continental Europe and enjoyed a renaissance in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, under the influence of the “School of 
Salamanca” or “Spanish Late Scholastics.”26  
                                                 
23 See, inter alia, Ossorio Morales, J., Crisis en la Dogmática del Contrato, 
Tomo I, ADC, 1952, pp. 1175-1176; Ranouil, V., L'autonomie de la volonté: 
naissance et evolutión d'un concept,  9, 10., Paris, 1980. 
24 Williston, Freedom of Contract (1921) 6 Cornell Law Quarterly 365, 366-9. 
Traditional European legal historians and contract theorists commonly view the 
French theorists Jean Domat, the great initiator, to whom we owe the concept of 
‘natural equity’ and Robert Pothier, whose analysis of contract formed the basis of the 
French Code civil of 1804, as the founders of the ‘will theory’.  Where discussion 
exists of the French theorists’ legal ancestry, those most commonly cited as being 
influential upon their thinking are the German natural lawyers Grotius and Pufendorf.   
25 See inter alia, Orduña Moreno, F.J., Contratación y consumo, pp.261-265, 
Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 1998; and Lete del Rio, M., Derecho de Obligaciones,  
Cáp I, p 22 et seq., Madrid 1995. 
26 “La Escuela Escolástica Salmantina” per De Castro y Bravo, F., Derecho Civil 
de España, Madrid, 1949; and Gordley, J., to whom we owe the term ‘the late 
scholastics’ in The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine, Oxford 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991. See also Perez Luño, A.E., La Polémica sobre el 
Nuevo Mundo, Aproximación al Iusnaturalismo Clásico Español, Ed. Trotta, Madrid, 
1992, at pp.32-33.  Other prominent Spanish humanists of the era included Diego de 
Covarrubias y Leyva, ‘the Spanish Bartolo’ (1512 – 1571), Francisco de Vitoria 
(1480-), Francisco Suárez (1489 – 1546), and to a lesser extent Melchor Cano, Martín 




Influenced by the moral teachings of Aristotle and St. Thomas 
Aquinas,27 and imitating the progress made in other European law faculties or 
legal scuola which were flourishing throughout Europe, a corpus of scholastic 
humanists, led primarily by Luis de Molina (1535-1600) and Domingo de 
Soto (1494-1560), sought to further moralize private law and additional legal 
concepts with Christian principles. The late scholastics meticulously analyzed 
the phenomenon of contracting in its entirety, including the binding force of 
promises, consent and its vitiation, the requirement of “una justa causa” or 
“just cause” for the enforceability of agreements, the theory of offer and 
acceptance, the content of contracts and the concept of equality in exchange, 
ultimately outlining a complex and intricate contractual system with detailed, 
specific rules28 to govern particular sale, hire, barter and loan contracts29 
which found its justification not solely with recourse to the will of the parties 
- though this was evidently an important factor - but rather on the basis of 
virtues such as promise-keeping, liberality and substantive justice.30   
                                                                                                                    
de Azpilcueta, Juan de la Peña, Domingo Bañez, etc. See respectively, Weiacker, F., 
A History of Private Law in Europe - With Particular Reference to Germany, Transl. 
per Weir, T, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1996. Glyn-Watkin, T., An Historical 
Introduction to Modern Civil Law, Aldershot, 1999. Ibbetson, D.J., An Historical 
Introduction to the Law of Obligations, Oxford University Press, 1999. Gordley, J., 
The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine, Oxford Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1991. 
27 “Los grandes humanistas españoles fueron influidos por la doctrina de 
Aristotolés y la Summa Theologica de Santo Tomás”, see De Castro y Bravo, F., op 
cit., p.155. 
28 A ‘just’ contract required that both parties were familiar with all relevant terms 
and conditions, that the parties established a fair price, which created a warranty on 
the quality of the object of the contract.  
29 Grundmann has highlighted the teleological approach of the European 
legislator over the last decade in introducing contract law rules which focus upon a 
specific type of transaction and adopt a particular regulatory approach.  EC contract 
law concentrates upon transactions which typically concern large volumes and that 
are not purely domestic. It is primarily obstacles to these transactions and resultant 
risks which are eliminated, see Grundmann, S., The Structure of European Contract 
Law, ibid. The late scholastics similarly adopted a teleological vision of contract 
arguing that an agreed transaction ought to be upheld, not because it was the 
expressed will of the parties - though this was evidently an equally important factor - 
but because of the validity, legal and moral, of the ultimate goal or object of the 
parties in entering into contractual relations, see Gordley, J., The Philosophical 
Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine, ibid, at pp.240-1.   
30 See also, in particular, Part I: Some Perennial Problems in Gordley, J. (ed.), 
The Enforceability of Promises in European Contract Law, Cambridge Studies in 




The theories developed31 by these pioneering European law and 
economics scholars were further analyzed by leading advocates of natural law 
in northern Europe, such as Grotius and Pufendorf 32, who continued the late 
scholastic tradition but simplified much of the early humanist concepts.  In so 
doing Grotius and Pufendorf popularised the legal doctrines but in the process 
much of the detail and theoretical precision was lost.33 Gordley and Weiacker 
suggest that Pufendorf and Barbeyrac were greatly influenced by 
contemporary scientific and mathematic thought, particularly that of 
Descartes and as such “allowed philosophical principles and legal doctrine to 
drift apart,”34 and with Christian Wolff, who developed contract theory 
scientifically and deductively on a pragmatic basis,35 the late scholastic debate 
                                                                                                                    
International and Comparative Law & The Common Core of European Private Law, 
2001.   
31 Though not completely 'de novo'. The late scholastic thinkers were evidently 
building upon the scaffold erected by the Romano-canon lawyers of the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries. The Spanish civilian jurists of the preceding generations had 
advanced highly innovative and progressive contractual theories. In particular, they 
had expressly advocated the principle of freedom of contract in Título XVI of the 
Ordinance of Álcala, of 1345. Whilst the canonists had concluded in principle that 
contracts were binding because of the consent of the contracting parties, the late 
scholastics reached the same conclusion by arguing from the standpoint of neo-
Thomist and Aristotelian philosophy. 
32 See Watson, A, The Making of the Civil Law, Harvard University Press, 1981, 
pp.83 et seq.  Both humanists were undoubtedly familiar with the writings of the 
Spanish humanists, and Gordley suggests that Grotius in particular was a "late 
scholastic at heart".  Wieacker adds that, Grotius "... frequently invokes Vitoria, 
Covarruvias, Ayala and Fernando Vázquez: their influence was all the greater because 
despite the War of Independence the cultural links between Spain and the Netherlands 
were still strong", ibid, at p.229.  For an alternative analysis see Welzel - who posits 
the theories of Grotius in the earlier philosophies of stoicism: Welzel, H., 
Introducción a la Filosofía del Derecho, Aguilar, Madrid, 1971, pp.128-129.  See 
also Marín López, A., La Doctrina del Derecho Natural en H. Grocio, Anales de la 
Cátedra Francisco Suárez, Universidad de Granada, núm.2, Granada, 1962, pp.205-
211. 
33 Whether through an inability to completely comprehend the ‘late scholastic’ 
doctrines or indeed as a consequence of their rejection by the German natural lawyers, 
the end result was the loss of philosophical and moral justifications underpinning 
contract law. 
34 See Gordley, J., ibid, pp.133 et seq.  See also Van Caenegem, R.C., An 
Historical Introduction to Private Law, Cambridge University Press, 1994, at p.116.   
35  See Van Caenegem, R.C., ibid,  at p.119. 
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finally dropped out of sight, as he failed to comprehend the Aristotelian 
tradition that he was attempting to modernize and revive.36  
 
It is important, however, to stress what most commentators fail to 
recognize: the existence of two very different though not distinct ‘Schools’ of 
Salamanca, which in the gloss of history have largely been fused as one.  As 
Brett observes, the terms “School of Salamanca” and “second scholastic” 
usually apply to the entire period of sixteenth-century Spanish scholasticism, 
from Vitoria to Suárez.37 They therefore span both the early Dominican period 
and the later, Jesuit-dominated stage, when the movement had ceased to be 
centered on the University of Salamanca.  However, “the Jesuit continuation 
of work of the School is a study in its own right.”  
 
A decisive change occurred, however, in the intellectual climate of 
western Europe in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries with the 
dawn of the Enlightenment; a philosophical movement which sought to 
liberate the individual from the medieval bondage of traditional authorities in 
religion, politics, law and culture, and to subject these powerful bastions to 
‘rational’ criticism.38 It was with the advent of ‘natural reason’ that the 
                                                 
36 “... los humanistas ... liquidaron en el plano histórico-crítico la pretensión de 
identificar a Aristóteles con la Verdad”, por Garin, E., La Revolución cultural del 
Renacimiento, 2nd edn, Barcelona, 1984, at p.256.  See also Gordley, J., op cit., at 
p.133. 
37 Francisco de Vitoria, (1480-1546). Thomas Glyn Watkin views Vitoria as the 
modern founding father of the European law of obligations, whilst Francisco Suárez 
(1548-1670) has been singled out by one historian of legal interpretation as one of the 
most vigorous and sophisticated thinker on issues of legal textual interpretation and 
meaning of his time, see Lefebvre, C. Les Pouvoirs du Juge en Droit Canonique, 
Paris, 1938. Lefebvre's study points to the qualities of Suárez's work in comparison 
with that of his contemporaries, even though it did not form part of the “common 
stock of ideas and theories in the first third of the seventeenth century, even if it 
necessarily falls within the conceptual paradigms of that time”. Suárez's Tractibus de 
Legibus ac deo legislatore was published apparently for international consumption in 
Coimbra, 1612, Antwerp 1613, Lyons 1613 and Mainz in 1619.  Yet, Watkin 
provides illuminating evidence as to why the theories of the scholastic thinkers failed 
to gain a dominant position within mainstream European legal thought: Suárez was 
published expensively in folio, whereas many monographs appeared in smaller, 
cheaper formats; and his work was not included under the rubric libri juridici in the 
book fair catalogues. Instead his volume, financed initially by the Bishop of Egitania 
and not, apparently, by a speculative publisher, was produced with the needs of Jesuit 
colleges in mind, and was addressed to canon, not civil, lawyers", ibid, at p.48. 
38 Friedmann, W., Legal Theory, pp.114 & 115, Steven & Sons, 5th Ed., London 
1967. See also Van Caenegem, R.C., An Historical Introduction to Private Law, 
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authority of Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy collapsed, the dominance 
of the Roman Catholic church declined and the validity of the scholastic 
natural law theories of contract was finally rejected.39 The historic precepts of 
the law of contracts predicated upon ancient doctrines emanating from a 
vague confluence of Roman legal thought and the moral authority of Aristotle 
and St. Thomas Aquinas were hollowed out and replaced by a new ideology, 
which stressed the sovereignty of the individual.  The novel project of the 
natural lawyers was the intellectual enlightenment of society, thus legal 
doctrine and moral philosophy under the influence of the northern natural law 
school began to drift apart.40   
 
As Simmonds observes, “the shift away from Aristotelian 
jurisprudence had a number of consequences. It gave rise to a vision of 
political order spanning two contrasting traditions of juridical thought - 
exemplified by Grotius and Hobbes - that continue to exercise their 
influence.”41 The desire to achieve conceptual clarity and to present a general 
law of contractual obligations which could be defended with recourse to 
“natural reason,” prompted the later “pioneers of abstraction,” the French 
                                                                                                                    
pp.117 et seq., Cambridge University Press, 1994. This analysis is not shared by 
Watson however, who discounts any hostility toward the established order on the part 
of the German natural lawyers, see Watson, A., The Making of the Civil Law, ibid, 
pp.88 et seq., Harvard University Press, 1981.  
39 “It was at this point that the authority of Aristotle collapsed in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries and the philosophical foundations of the law of contract were 
lost”, see Gordley, ibid, p.161. 
40 See Gordley, ibid, at p.133.  
41 “In particular, the tradition of positivism was ultimately to yield a conception 
of legal scholarship quite different from that of Grotius and his successors”, 
Simmonds, N.E., Protestant Jurisprudence and Modern Doctrinal Scholarship, 60(2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 271, 2001, at p.300.  Brett’s discussion of the impact of late 
scholastic thinking on both Grotius and Hobbes legal and political theories is further 
illuminating. She discusses the divisions among contemporary theorists as to whether 
the late scholastics sought a return to an authentic Thomist-Aristotelian theory, 
founded on such notions as pure natural law and of right as the object of justice 
(objective right), or whether, although on the surface these Spanish neo-Thomists 
appeared faithful to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, in reality they thought of right as 
a faculty or liberty of the individual (subjective right) and that as such their political 
theory, as premised upon such legal rights, ought to be viewed therefore as a 
forerunner to Hobbes legal philosophy. For an analysis of late scholastic doctrine in 
the development of European philosophy, see also Skinner, Q.R.D., The Foundations 
of Modern Political Thought, Volume II, Cambridge, 1978. 
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theorists42 to systematize the prevailing natural law theories, which were of 
late scholastic origin, into a rational and popular legal doctrine. Van der Walt 
notes that  
 
many theorists wanted to ensure that choices among competing rights 
were constrained by clear and unambiguous principles, so that 
judicial judgment could be separated from the uncertainties of 
political rhetoric and metaphysical theory. The lawyers of the 
Enlightenment were, in a word, looking for a legal science in which 
certainty was guaranteed through method. Ever since the 
Enlightenment this implied that the legal story … would have to be 
transformed from a religious fable into a scientific dissertation.43  
 
The eighteenth century ferment of ideas was itself a reflection of the 
needs and tensions of a changing society based on the new scientific 
knowledge of the seventeenth century, which bred a new faith in reason and 
progress. The philosophers whose intellectual radicalism fuelled the 
Enlightenment rejected traditional authority and asserted the ‘Rights of Man’ 
expressed in Rousseau’s statement that ‘man is born free but is everywhere in 
chains.’ The concepts of reason, freedom and tolerance were a dominant force 
in a society undergoing rapid industrialization. The new economic wisdom 
was laissez-faire capitalism which combined with the philosophical drive of 
the Enlightenment theorists who proclaimed man to be a free, rational 
                                                 
42 See, inter alia, Gómez Arboleya, E., El Racionalismo Jurídico y los Códigos 
Europeos, Estudios de Teoría de la Sociedad y del Estado, Centro de Estudios 
Constitucionales, Madrid, 1962, pp.476-477.  The German systematisers, Wolff and 
Savigny, were undoubtedly influential, yet in the ambit of contract law, it was the 
French legal theorists Domat y Pothier, who were instrumental in the birth of a 
generalised, abstract theory of contract, premised upon the principles of autonomy 
and freedom, which were justified with recourse to ‘natural reason’. Domat's general 
law of contract is often reduced to the basic principle that, ‘all contracts, whether they 
have a particular name or not, always have their effect, and oblige the parties to do 
what is agreed on’ Domat, J, Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel, Book 1, Title 1. 
See Remy, J., Les Oeuvres Complets de Jean Domat, 1830. This subjective 
‘internalization’ of contractual obligations - the meeting of minds or concurrence of 
two or more independent wills - though evidently supported by external, objective 
elements became the cornerstone of the French natural law theory of contract.     
43 See Van der Walt, A., Marginal Notes on Powerful Legends: Critical 
Perspectives on Property Theory, 58 THRHR, (1995) 402. Indeed, in of the late 
scholastics role in the formation of the modern law of contract one is minded of John 
Henry Newman's fable of the Man and the Lion, Lions would have fared better, had 
lions been the artists, cited by Keneally in How the Irish Saved Civilisation 
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individual whose right it was to order his own affairs freed from the formulaic 
exigencies of the past.  
 
The new economic and political order that evolved from rapid 
industrialization and the post Enlightenment democratic rationalism saw a 
swift expansion in the area of contractual litigation with the concomitant 
necessity to find an effective law of contract based on the new doctrines of 
reason and free market liberalism, freed from historical and moral 
anachronisms.  To such a mind-set the ceding of any moral authority to the 
theologically inspired philosophers of the past would have appeared as a 
betrayal of the new age of realism.  Furthermore the philosophical discourse 
of the “late scholastics” belonged to an age of scholastic theorizing often 
freed from the practicalities of legal interpretation.44 The new age theorists 
faced a different dynamic; to produce a practical blueprint for a society with a 
rapidly expanding need for a workable law of contract. As Zimmermann 
stresses, a desire to promote “greater publicity of the law” was an equally 
“admirable philosophical and educational idea espoused and energetically 
promoted by eighteenth century enlightened authoritarianism: the 
comprehensive and systematic re-organization of law and society along the 
lines of natural reason and in the form of codification aimed at making the 
law accessible, at instructing all subjects.”45 
 
However, perhaps more important in the evolution of classical 
contract theory than the writings of the legal theorists was the period of the 
Enlightenment itself; like any social revolution it was greater than any 
individual.  Much more than any pure theory it was the general thrust of an 
era.46 Northern natural law claimed that men had an inalienable right to own 
property and contract as they saw fit.  To the principles of laissez faire and 
laissez passer was added laissez contracter. As such, whether as a result of 
legal practicalities and the prevailing economic and political realities of the 
age, or as a consequence of latent hostility to the earlier more theologically 
                                                 
44 It is important to note, however, that the doctrines of the Spanish natural 
lawyers, premised upon an ideal of justice which formed part of a universal or divine 
law- Van Caenegem, R.C., An Historical Introduction to the Private Law, p.117, 
Cambridge University Press, 1994 - failed to find legal expression in practice, either 
in the courts or in legislative enactments, and are thus largely consigned to history. 
45 Zimmermann, R., Codification: History and Present Significance of an Idea, 3 
European Review of Private Law 95, 1995. 
46 It was a general thought and a particular perception of society, of morality, of 
order. The “ethereal intellectual constructions” of the advocates of the law of reason, 
provided an alternative approach to the analysis of conceptual problems, per Zweigert 
& Kötz, ibid,  at p.142.  
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based philosophies, or perhaps even due to an inability to properly 
comprehend them, when the body of learning developed by the late 
scholastics was taken up by the northern natural law school the most 
important elements of promise keeping, virtue and substantive justice were 
lost. The moral arguments from which obligations emerged and on which they 
were premised were abandoned, and only the part of the theory concerned 
with the will of the parties, together with its structure of concepts based on 
offer and acceptance as the expression of the parties' agreement, was 
retained.47  
 
THE ASSIMILATION OF FRENCH NATURAL LAW THEORY AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH COMMERCIAL CONTRACT LAW 
 
The process of assimilation into English law of a generalised law of 
contract founded upon the classical theory of private contractual autonomy, 
which was dubbed ‘the will theory,’ and the mantra of ‘freedom of contract’ 
evolved during the late eighteenth48 and early nineteenth century, beginning in 
earnest with the publication of Robert Pothier’s, Traité des Obligations in 
1806.  The ‘novel’ theory that the mere consent or willingness of both parties 
to form contractual relations should prove sufficient for the legal system to 
afford legal protection to contractual agreements had a profound effect on the 
English treatise writers and judiciary.  The French theorists’ abstract analysis 
of contract as an accords de volontés’ or meeting of minds, premised upon a 
                                                 
47 Indeed Gordley suggests that when the authority of Aristotle collapsed in 
northern Europe what remained of the ‘late scholastics’ theory to the untrained mind 
was the concept of the will of the parties.  See also, Gordley, J. Myths of the French 
Civil Code, 47(3) The American Journal of Comparative Law, 1994. 
48  Hawkes v Saunders, 1 Cowper 289, 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 (K.B. 1782). In the late 
eighteenth century Lord Mansfield suggested that in English law, as in the civil law, 
all promises seriously made should be considered as legally binding, subject to a 
broad theory of what may be called 'invalidating cause', which was remarkably 
similar to the civilian concept of the 'justa causa'; see also Payne v Cave, 3 Term R. 
148, 100 Eng. Rep. 502 (1789) and Cooke v Oxley, 3 Term R. 653, 100 Eng. Rep. 
785 (1790) in which distinctly civilian terminology was employed by the courts; yet, 
as Horwitz notes, "only in the nineteenth century did judges and jurists reject the 
belief that the justification [for enforcing] a contractual obligation is derived from the 
inherent justice or fairness of an exchange. In its place they asserted for the first time 
that the source of the obligation of contract is the convergence of the wills of the 
contracting parties", see Horwitz, M.J., The Historical Foundations of Modern 
Contract Law, 87 Harvard Law Review 917. 
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reciprocal offer and acceptance, provided a generalised system that fitted the 
spirit of the age and was readily welcomed into English law.49  
 
Indeed, it seems irrefutable that, before the writings of Blackstone, in 
England “the science of law in all that relates to contracts was left almost 
without cultivation.”50 Similar to the proliferation of legal schools throughout 
continental Europe from the twelfth century onwards, the adoption of 
continental contract theories arose via the promotion in England of the legal 
treatise,51 which heralded a new common law approach to the analysis of the 
law, provoking theorists and students to engage in debate and conceptualise 
                                                 
49 “The authority of Pothier … is as high as can be had, next to the decision of a 
Court of Justice in this country”, per Best J, Cox v Troy (1822) B & Ald 474, at 480. 
Without doubt the generality and abstraction offered by Pothier's analysis was warmly 
received into an English legal system that had endured since the sixteenth century the 
uncompromising system of Assumpsit.  
50 Carey, “A Course of Lectures on the Law of Contract: Lecture 1”, The Law 
Times (1845) at 463.  As Horwitz notes, “Modern contract law is fundamentally a 
creature of the nineteenth century”, see Horwitz, M.J., ibid; See also Atiyah, P.S., An 
Introduction to Contract Law, at p.7. The main corpus of the general principles and 
theory of the modern English law of contract, including the concepts of offer and 
acceptance, the intention to create legal relations, the various forms of vitiation of 
consent etc, were developed and elaborated in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century via treatise. 
51 J.J. Powell's Essay upon the Law of Contracts (1790) developed upon 
Blackstones' Commentaries (1765-69) which devoted a mere forty pages to 'contracts' 
and focused primarily upon contracts for land; however it was Pothier's Traite des 
obligations of 1761 which proved most influential both in the courts and among legal 
academics, prompting the works of the later treatise writers such as Chitty (1818), 
Pollock (1875), Anson (1879), etc. In this regard, it is important to highlight the 
important role of Ibbetson in unearthing Sir Jeffrey Gilbert's unprinted treatise on 
contract: "which has a good claim to be the first serious work on the subject in 
England"  and which bears a strong imprint of the thinking of Thomas Hobbes social 
contract theories.  Moreover, "Pufendorf's influence is abundantly clear in the first 
published English work on contract with any pretension to treat the subject on an 
abstract basis, a Treatise on Equity published anonymously in 1737, but probably the 
work of Henry Ballow or Bellewe of Lincoln's Inn.  For the most part his discussion 
of contract consists of brief paraphrases of or unattributed quotations from the English 
translation of Pufendorf's De iure nature et gentium, followed by illustrative material 
from English case law," see Ibettson, ibid, at p.73. In similar fashion to the 
continental legal schools of the Middle Ages, the use of the legal treatise in England 
and later in the U.S., can be viewed as both the forum and the emerging vehicle for 
the debate and promotion of contract theories.   
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legal problems in a traditionally civilian manner. 52  Identical motivations to 
those that drove the Enlightenment theorists in a previous age demanded that 
the general principles and legal theory behind many of the developments in 
the courts be enunciated. The attempts to systematise the law of contract, 
however, marked a significant break with common law tradition.53 
As Cornish and Clark affirm, the judges wanted rules and were 
searching for principle in a rapidly expanding area of their business, and their 
small number constrained their ability to make precedent.54 The English 
judiciary, similar to the Enlightenment theorists before them, was faced with a 
new legal challenge; their immediate priority was to produce a practical legal 
framework for an industrialized society with a rapidly expanding need for a 
coherent law of contract. Formal recognition of the adoption of natural law 
theories in the English courts was forthcoming as evidenced in the leading 
case of Adams v Lindsell55 and by the mid nineteenth century, “will theory” 
had taken root in English law.56   
 
Indeed it has been suggested that the northern natural law theories 
were so popular among the legal fraternity that the case law ought to be 
viewed as a mere reinforcement of the doctrine or as ‘fruits on the conceptual 
                                                 
52 An importation of a civilian outlook into the common law was the logical 
result of an acceptance of civilian theories; see Simpson, AWB, The Rise and Fall of 
the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, (1981) 48 
University of Chicago Law Review 632. 
53 The common lawyers "engaged upon an enterprise that was new to the 
common law ... but old to the civilian tradition; they were trying to do what the 
civilians, the canonists and the natural lawyers had been doing for centuries", 
Simpson, AWB, 'Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law' (1975) 91 LQR 
254.  
54 See, Cornish, W.R. & Clark, G.N., Law and Society in England 1750 –1950, 
pp.200 et seq., London, 1989. See also Rubin, G.R., Law, Economy and Society, 1750 
– 1914: Essays in the History of English Law, London, 1984.   
55 (1818) 1 B & Ald 681 - This case is widely regarded in English contract law as 
constituting the birth of the concept of "offer and acceptance". Simpson supra 
suggests that the court relied heavily upon Pothier's "Treatise on the Contract of Sale" 
which provides that "a contract is affirmed by the coincidence of the will of [the two 
contracting parties], where one promises something to the other, and the other accepts 
the promise that he was made" - 'le contrat renferme le concours des volontés de deux 
personnes, dont l'une promet quelque chose a l'autre, et l'autre accepte la promesse 
qui lui est faite'.  
56 Atiyah, P.S.,  The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, ibid, at p.407.  See 
also wealth of caselaw;  e.g. Pole v Leask (1863) 33 L.J. Ch. 155;  Dickinson v Dodds 
(1876) 2 Ch.D 463, at 472;  Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App. Cas. 459, at 465.  
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tree.’57  The universality of this abstract construct was similarly attractive to 
academic and judicial opinion, which was endeavoring to discern the general 
basic principles of contract law.58  
  
Gordley stresses that, “the courts were evidently highly influenced by 
the treatise writers who had merely translated natural law theories into 
English."59  In turn the natural lawyers had developed their contractual 
theories from the writings of the late scholastics, which were defended with 
recourse to the philosophy of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. And yet, “this 
philosophy was almost unintelligible to the nineteenth century jurists. 
Consequently, the treatise writers often borrowed superficially, repeating the 
phrases of the natural lawyers with little understanding of their original 
meaning. They often borrowed selectively, neglecting doctrines that seemed 
alien and repugnant. The nineteenth century jurists arrived at their will 
theories by starting with the doctrines of the natural lawyers and purging them 
of older Aristotelian concepts they did not understand. Will was the single 
most important concept that remained.”60 
   
The expressed will of the parties thus became the impetus to the 
formation of contracts and constituted the justification for their enforcement;61 
as such the intention of the contracting parties became the kernel of early 
nineteenth century contract law.  With increasing regularity English judges 
were referring to Roman law concepts such as the requirement that the courts 
find a “consensus ad idem”62 between the parties who were at liberty to 
“realize their wills” and to the late scholastic theory of the binding force of 
promises. Unless the two minds were ad idem there could be no contract.  
Dicta in Cundy v Lindsay63 further reveal that judicial support for the will 
                                                 
57 See Danzig, R., A Study in the Industrialisation of Law- Hadley V Baxendale, 
(1975) 4 Journal of Legal Studies 249.      
58 “When Pothier's works began to be read in England they must have appeared a 
revelation of clarity of exposition”, per Adams, J.N. & Brownsword, R., 
Understanding Contract Law, at p.32., 2nd Edition, London, 1996,   
59 Gordley, J., op cit., p.161 et seq. 
60 Gordley, J., op cit., at p.162.   
61 The justification for enforcing contracts was to be found in the convergence of 
the parties wills. 
62  Haynes v Haynes (1861) 1 Dr & Sm 426, 433 – “when both parties will the 
same thing, and each communicates his will to the other, with a mutual agreement to 
carry it into effect, then an engagement or contract between the two is constituted”, 
per Kindersley VC. 
63  (1878) 3 App Cas 459, at 467. Agreement is necessarily the outcome of 
consenting minds. 
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theory was still enduring in the late nineteenth century and that contracts were 
consistently being interpreted as the product of a ‘consensus of minds.’  
    
However, having assimilated and promoted the subjective concept of 
autonomy, the English courts were further required to interpret the sense of 
the reciprocal declarations and determine whether, in fact, the parties had 
agreed to contract.  In the event, the test imposed by the courts was evidently 
an objective test.  Objectivity prevailed since the courts, having regard to the 
external manifestations of agreement, were obliged to rule on whether or not 
an agreement had in fact been made64; and ensure that commercial common 
sense was not adversely affected by the operation of a subjective ‘will theory’. 
In the period prior to the assimilation of Continental legal theories English 
law had labored under the cumbersome doctrine of assumpsit; as the legal 
remedy for situations in which one party was in breach of an undertaking 
made to another. In such cases it was necessary to examine the external acts 
of both parties. It was thus logical for the courts in considering whether there 
had in fact been an intention on the part of the contracting parties to create 
legal relations to apply an objective test as a means of rationalizing the 
subjective will theory. The majority of Anglo-American legal academics have 
reasoned from the perspective that classical contract doctrine was elaborated 
in the courts and fitted into the spirit of the age. Yet only those such as 
Watkin, Ibbetsson and perhaps more emphatically, Gordley have begun to 
recognize that the traditional doctrine as introduced into Britain was 
incomplete, thus provoking the courts to ‘bend and stretch the doctrines they 
had borrowed to do the work of those they had not.’65  
 
Importantly, O'Malley asks the question why the complex doctrines 
of the late scholastics were ‘sloughed off’ in favor of a “stripped down will 
theory.”  He suggests that most of the commentaries are “strangely silent on 
the question, perhaps because a principal item on their agenda is the denial of 
propositions concerning the impact on common law of capitalistic economic 
interests and liberal political theory.”  However, the influence of classical 
                                                 
64 Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 – “If, whatever a man’s real intention be, 
he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would believe that he is assenting to the 
terms proposed by the other party, and that other party upon that belief enters into the 
contract with him, the man thus conducting himself would be equally bound as if he 
had intended to agree to other party’s terms, per Blackburn J.  Similar observations 
were made in Bardell v Pickwick and in the later US case of Hotchkiss v National City 
Bank, 200F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y.) 1911.  It is evident however, from this historical 
analysis, that this conclusion had been reached by the civilian framers of Las Siete 
Partidas in fourteenth century Spain. 
65  Gordley, J., ibid, p.135. 
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liberalism in the shaping of English classical contract theory, with its 
emphasis on the sovereignty of the individual, and the economic theories of 
those such as Adam Smith, has largely been accepted without engendering 
much controversy.  In particular, Anglo-American analyses of the historical 
development of the pillars of classical contract theory have been presented by 
those such as Horwitz,66 who suggests that the emergence of classical contract 
theory was due primarily to the demise of the “moral obligation” doctrine in 
the law of consideration,67 a formal recognition of the executory contract, the 
awarding of expectation damages; and  in particular due to deliberate judicial 
activism in order to promote the capitalist system and commercial interests. 
 
In support of the Horwitz thesis it is widely accepted that the role of 
equity in the area of contract law declined, as the ‘moral obligation’ doctrine 
in the law of consideration was expunged by the courts.68 This radical and 
intentional doctrinal shift in contract theory in the early nineteenth century 
away from the old system of equity, which was viewed as being antagonistic 
to the interests of commerce, and the embracing of novel concepts to support 
the capitalist system was undoubtedly due to the influence of economic 
liberalism on the English judiciary. As Cornish & Clark observe, “the 
generalizations evolved by the text-writers and judges undoubtedly buttressed 
freedom of dealing and sanctity of bargaining, the economic security of 
market place pricing over government regulation and the moral righteousness 
of self sufficiency and self improvement.” There was without doubt a 
common belief among those judges sympathetic to the laissez faire economics 
of the era that just as Adam Smith's ‘hidden hand’ analysis of the market 
would ensure the proper functioning of the economy, so the hidden subjective 
“meeting of minds” would ensure the smooth operation of contract law. As 
Pollock affirms: The sort of men who became judges towards the middle of 
the century were imbued with the creed of the philosophical radicals for 
whom the authority of the orthodox economists came second only to 
Bentham's and whose patron saint was Ricardo.69 The judge most commonly 
cited as reflective of the general attitude as George William Bramwell, a 
leading advocate of laissez faire economics and a persistent champion of 
                                                 
66 Though his thesis has been rejected by Simpson as being ‘oversimplified’ in 
Simpson, A.W.B., The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 University of 
Chicago Law Review 533, at p.600.  
67  See Eastwood v Kenyon (1840) 11 A&E 438, 113 ER 482. 
68  See Atiyah, P.S., The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, ibid, pp.388 et 
seq.   
69  39 LQR 163, at 165, per Frederick Pollock. 
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“real” consent.70 The liberal judiciary prided itself on its rejection of moral 
paternalism. The prevailing view, consistent with liberal ideology, remained 
that individuals should be permitted the maximum liberty to contract71. 
Moreover, the small number of practicing judges72 reveals that it would have 
been possible for the ideology of freedom of contract and laissez-faire to be 
promoted through the courts.73 For this reason it is possible to view the 
absolutist dogma of ‘freedom of contract’ as operated in classical English 
contract law as essentially a judicial construct and as a ‘larger ideological 
orientation which accompanied the growth of industrial capitalism’, though 
the philosophies used to support this novel theory were in reality something of 
a continental European pastiche.74 Importantly, the adherence of the English 
common law judiciary to classical liberalism and the capitalist system meant 
that the inherent injustices of that system were merely transplanted into 
nineteenth century contract law since “the contractarians ideology above all 
expressed a market conception of legal relations.  As the only measure of 
justice was the parties’ own agreement, all pre-existing legal duties were 
inevitably subordinated to the contract relation. The law had come simply to 
ratify those forms of inequality that the market system produced.”75    
                                                 
70  See Atiyah, P.S., The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, pp.375 et seq, 
and Tillotson, J., Contract Law In Perspective, 2nd ed., p.42, London, 1995., who 
notes that ‘enthusiasm for freedom of contract went hand in hand with support for the 
operation of a free market’. See also Freil, R.J., The Law of Contract, 1995. 
71 See Collins, H., Legal Theory and Common Law, OUP, 1996, at p.144. As 
Atiyah stresses, the common belief was that “people could be trusted to look after 
themselves, to see to their own interests, and this led to a rejection of paternalism” 
and the adoption of an umpirical or abstentionist position by the courts.  See Atiyah, 
P.S., ‘Freedom of Contract and the New Right’, in Essays on Contract, Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1996 and Rubin, G.R., Law, Economy and Society, 1980 at pp12-13 
and pp.70-71. 
72 Cornish, W.R. and Clark, G de N, Law and Society in England, 1750-1950, 
p.206, Professional Books, London, 1989. 
73 In addition, the introduction of the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 further 
assisted the development of the concept of freedom of contract by abolishing the 
various procedural forms of action in the courts.  
74 See Cornish and Clark, ibid, at p.202. Moreover, as Gilmore notes, ‘the 
classical theory of contract did not come as the natural result of case-law development 
… it represented a sharp break with the past’, Gilmore, G., The Death of Contract, 
Ohio State University Press, 1974, at pp.17-18. Importantly, the population of London 
more than doubled in the period between 1800 and 1850 and the social conditions in 
Britain during the age of classical contract are perhaps best illustrated by Blakes’ 
poem ‘London’. 
75 Rubin, G.R., Law, Economy and Society, London, 1984, p.70. Curiously, 
Gordley rejects any grander ideological motives on the part of the common law 




The English common law judiciary adopted these novel civilian 
contractual theories and concepts, which were considered most suitable for an 
emerging industrialized society, and thereafter embarked upon a process of 
commercialization of the law, characterized by a pragmatic attitude and a 
close tracking of commercial interests.  Indeed, even those with the most 
rudimentary legal schooling in the historical development of contract law in 
European legal systems would have quickly grasped that the English law of 
contract, having borrowed so liberally from the civilian traditions, thereafter 
chose to bend and mould these new “legal transplants” to best suit the will of 
the business elite. The moral dimension or concept of good faith, was largely 
viewed as an impediment to trade.   
 
It may be argued that this was due to a degree of legal naivety on the 
part of the English judiciary, prompted by a lack of familiarity with the 
fundamental structures of continental contract theory, which resulted in the 
erroneous interpretation of the principle of freedom of contract and 
contributed in part to its irrational interpretation.76 The principle of freedom of 
contract, which had been advocated by the canonists in fourteenth century 
Spain and which was impliedly enshrined in the French Code civil was 
merely that; a principle. Yet the English courts elevated the principle of 
freedom of contract into a fixed rule or end in itself77 and thus embarked on a 
                                                                                                                    
judiciary.  He suggests that in practice, ‘we find little direct borrowing from 
philosophers, economists or political theorists.  Only rarely do we find any sign of 
commitment to liberal values of freedom or individualism.  We find almost the 
opposite: an insistence that the jurist can do his job without taking account of 
economics, philosophy, politics or values such as freedom ... They said almost 
nothing about any larger principles on which they were building’, ibid (1994) at 
p.215-216. 
76 León González, M.A., La evolución histórica del concepto del contrato, 
Lecciones sobre las obligaciones y contratos, Salamanca, May 12-14, 1998. This 
analysis of the development of freedom of contract in English law is a minority 
opinion which evidently questions much of the traditional thinking, though this author 
finds it highly persuasive.  
77  In the nineteenth century, freedom of contract was regarded by many 
philosophers, economists and judges as an end in itself, finding its philosophical 
justification in the ‘will theory’ of contract and its economic justification in laissez-
faire liberalism.  Chitty on Contracts, pp.5 et seq., 27th ed., Vol. I, General Principles, 
London, 1994. Caselaw in modern times reveals judicial recognition that the 
operation of an absolutist analysis of freedom of contract cannot be justified and that 
the doctrine has been reduced to a ‘general principle’, see for example Suisse 
Atlantique Société d’Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale 
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somewhat illogical process of upholding contractual agreements even where 
parties were operating from an unequal bargaining position.78 By the late 
nineteenth century, however, there was a general realization that this 
absolutist dogma of freedom of contract, operating without regard to social, 
equitable or moral considerations, was at best a utopian ideal and at worst a 
pernicious concept open to corruption by the wealthiest and most powerful 
sections of society.  In this I find myself agreeing with Atiyah and Friedman 
that the dogma of freedom of contract as it operated in Britain applied to an 
age of laissez faire liberalism and as a "mere theoretical construct, which 
[had] little or nothing to do with the real world, would not - or could not- 
change as the real world changed."79 It emerged as an absolutist doctrine at 
odds with a rapidly changing political and economic climate, for as Gilmore 
attests, 'its natural habitat was the law schools, not the law courts. On the 
whole, however, the theory was in its origins, and continued to be during its 
life, an ivory tower of abstraction.’80 Whilst the late scholastics had discussed 
not only the will of the parties, but the virtues of promise-keeping, liberality, 
and commutative justice, the final cause and essence of a contract, natural 
terms and equality in exchange, the jurists of the nineteenth-century rejected 
them.81 
                                                                                                                    
[1967] 1 AC 361, 399 and Photo Production Limited v Securicor Transport [1980] 
AC 827, 848. 
78 As Cornish and Clark note, the common law courts renounced their ‘earlier 
willingness to rectify elements of unfairness in bargains and instead insisted upon 
enforcing whatever terms had been agreed’. The common law support for a severely 
individualistic conception of freedom of contract contrasted with the courts of equity, 
which constituted ‘a protective jurisdiction of conscience’, ibid, at p.203. Evidently, 
as Horwitz notes, the role of the courts of equity had greatly diminished.   
79  Per Friedman in Gilmore, G., ibid, at p.7.  Cornish and Clark, ibid, suggest 
that the decline of the classical vision of contract ought to be traced from the year 
1876 onwards; as, following the Judicature Acts of 1873, in 1876, “the liberal 
hegemony of the mid-Victorian years was threatened by a novel, democratic 
“collectivism” and in that year a directive was issued giving preference to the rules of 
equity over the common law rules, at p.203.   
80  Gilmore, G., The Death of Contract, p.18., Ohio State University Press, 
Columbia, Ohio, 1974. 
81 "All these specific, substantive, moral considerations were omitted when this 
civilian law of contract was received into common law.  What was taken on board 
was only that part of the theory concerned with the parties will, and the categories 
based on offer and acceptance that were held to be the expression of their agreement.  
This, as Gordley stresses, was to create problems for the later development of contract 
law.  As a result of stripping away requirements for full understanding the common 
law had no way of dealing with the implied lack of consent.  Contract law in the first 
half of the century was far from the logical and complete doctrine that is imagined in 




"They were left with few other concepts than the will of the parties. 
Almost every important doctrine raised problems the will theorists tried in 
vain to resolve.82  Thus, whilst the will theory provided the law with the 
source, the content and the justification for the enforceability of contractual 
agreements, it failed to explain the reasons for the courts necessary intrusion 
into the realm of private agreements and provided no rational manner of 
resolving disputes raised by the operation of the theory in practice.83   
 
CONCLUSION - INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND THE DESIGN OF MODERN EC 
CONTRACT LAWS     
 
The leading US contract law professor, Melvin Eisenberg has 
consistently argued that a uniform American national law evolved under the 
influence of economics, common history, legal education and above all a 
desire among lawyers to be part of a common legal culture. If a European 
system of contract laws is to emerge and compete successfully with rival 
jurisdictions, it is not only imperative to ascertain the reasons for users current 
preference for English domestic law and US state laws but for a consensus to 
emerge among practitioners, judges and other users that such a uniform EC 
law is in the common interest. On a deeper level, the distinct lack of any sole 
institution with sufficient legitimacy and authority to impose a uniform 
template of agreed private law instead gives rise to the need for a coherent 
governance strategy to guide, monitor and validate the ongoing process of 
Europeanization - a strategy capable of ensuring a more satisfactory 
entrenchment of Community regulatory law into national legal systems.  
 
Though a similar proposal has been overlooked in the framing of 
both the 2003 Action Plan and 2004 Follow-up Communication, a new 
European Private Law Association (EPLA) should be reconsidered. Professor 
Walter Van Gerven, a former Advocate General at the ECJ in Luxembourg 
and consistent promoter of comparative case-law research has previously 
made the case for a ‘European Law Institute’ and a ‘Curriculum Commission’ 
which would seek to “educate practitioners in the use of any emerging 
                                                                                                                    
discourses on liberalism.  It also exhibited major lacunae that would later need to be 
filled", O’Malley, P., Uncertain Subjects: Risks, Liberalism and Contract, Journal of 
Economy and Society, pp.460-484, at p. 483. Vol. 29, Number 4, November, 2000. 
82 Gordley, J., op cit., p.160-1, who suggests that having failed to retain these 
earlier concepts they were unable to make their ‘will theory’ work.  
83 As Gilmore notes, classical contract was ‘an ivory tower of abstraction’ whose 
‘natural habitat was the law schools, not the law courts’,  Gilmore, G., The Death of 
Contract, p.18., Ohio State University Press, 1974. 
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codified law and to determine law curricula for universities thus promoting a 
common European legal culture.”84 An EPLA may find inspiration from the 
models of co-operation that currently exist between Nordic jurisdictions and 
the joint research activities of the Scottish Law Commission and the Law 
Commission of England & Wales.85     
 
Importantly, however, beyond substantive and procedural law 
harmonization, US and Canadian lawyers are similarly presented with much 
less practical hindrance in crossing jurisdictions than European lawyers who 
aim to practice law in other Member States. Providers of legal practice 
courses, for example, are notoriously conservative and users cite excessive 
cost, delay and confusion for qualified lawyers who aim to have their national 
qualifications afforded equal weight and standing in other EU jurisdictions.86 
The European University Institute and similar academic institutions are 
pioneering change in this regard by offering academic degrees that are fully 
recognized and accredited across all Member States.  
 
Notwithstanding these improvements, a formally established, public 
organization could play a crucial role in Member State surveillance and in 
disseminating information on existing diversity in national private laws whilst 
the CFR evolves. Equally important in the short-to-medium term is the need 
to scrutinize the transposition of EC Directives in the Member States in order 
to construct a database of the particular problems that a CFR may help to 
resolve.    
                                                 
84 Van Gerven, W., Codifying European Private Law? Yes, if ...! 156 European 
Private Law Review 2001. See also, Schmid, C.U., The Emergence of a 
Transnational Legal Science in European Private Law, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol.19, 1999 and Hesselink, M.W., The New European Legal Culture, 
Kluwer, 2001. Hesselink detects the emergence of a new European legal culture, 
characterized by a rejection of the formalism of the past and the promotion of a “more 
substance-orientated and pragmatic approach”. See, in particular, Chapter IV on 
‘European private law: Shift from Form to Substance’, pp.37 et seq.  
85 Indeed, the working methods employed by the Scottish Law Commission and 
the Law Commission of England & Wales, in bringing forward joint initiatives, 
deserve further academic scrutiny and may serve as an adequate template for future 
co-operation at EU level. Both Commissions have produced consistently high grade 
research and a recent study on the impact of Unfair Terms legislation has received 
much positive comment from business and consumer associations beyond both 
jurisdictions. 
86 For a suitable example of this problematic conservatism, see Report to the Irish 
Competition Authority on the Provision of Legal Practice Services in Ireland 
criticizing the current practices of King’s College, Dublin as the sole provider of 
formal legal practice examinations in Ireland. 




An EPLA could equally assist in ‘road-testing’ the emerging CFR 
and any later Optional Instrument(s) thus triggering ‘trial and error’ 
processes; and in devising means to negative the irritating effects of these new 
legal constructs.  Perhaps the most crucial role would be that of widely 
publicizing any emerging rules and principles. This would encourage an open, 
mutual learning process and would help to embed the CFR progressively. An 
EU Private Law Association could further assist the Commission's work by 
documenting “best practice” across the Union thus instilling indirect peer 
pressure on those national legal systems or economic actors that fail to 
comply with accepted EU-wide standards.  
 
Experience from previous uniform private law-making initiatives 
suggests that the approximation of national systems and the move towards a 
territorially delimited contract law for Europe will remain a consistently 
imperfect project, requiring continual revision and supervision. It will also 
require a keen sense of our shared history, the search for commonalities and 
above all a satisfactory supporting ethic.87 Yet, access to legal information 
and the free flow of modern theories are equally critical to the success of this 
endeavor.  
 
The lack of adequate legal research tools and/or the prohibitive cost 
of accessing available resources in a number of EU jurisdictions evidently 
complicates the current harmonisation effort. Notably, the absence of 
sophisticated nation-wide databases of case law and legislation in a number of 
jurisdictions has allowed French, British, Dutch and German scholars a 
unique advantage in steering the pace and direction of law reform. The 
publicly accessible website of the British and Irish Legal Information Institute 
is a notable example of what can be achieved.88 It further reveals how far a 
number of jurisdictions must travel in order to allow for adequate comparative 
analysis of contract law decisions. In the absence of such resources, our 
understanding of the extent of legal divergences, the practical implementation 
of current Community legislation and the types of disputes most commonly 
litigated in each jurisdiction will remain at best incomplete.  
                                                 
87 Brownsword, R., Individualism, Cooperativism and an Ethic for European 
Contract Law, 64(4) Modern Law Review 628 (2001). See also Truilhe-Marengo, E., 
Towards a European Law of Contracts,10(4) European Law Journal 463 (2004).  
88 See www.baili.org. Whilst by no means perfect, the BAILI website compiles 
updated legislation, caselaw and legal commentary from Britain, Ireland and the 
Commonwealth and provides access to a range of other ‘World resources’. 
